--Originally published at Mental Droppings of a Tired Student
This semester I took a Wireless Network class, I learned about security within a network and common attacks.
A Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack is achieved when an attacker poisons the ARP cache of two devices with the (48-bit) MAC address of their Ethernet NIC (Network Interface Card). Once the ARP cache has been successfully poisoned, each of the victim devices send all their packets to the attacker when communicating to the other device. This puts the attacker in the middle of the communications path between the two victim devices; hence the name Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack. It allows an attacker to easily monitor all communication between victim devices.
The objective of this MITM attack is to take over a session. The intent is to intercept and view the information being passed between the two victim devices.
Three (3) scenarios were used for the MITM attack. They were as follows:
ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) Poisoning, A.K.A. Man-In-The-Middle (MITM), is a very effective attack if proper mitigation techniques have not been implemented. As the MITM attack requires the attacker to be on the same network as the intended victims, an attack would need to be initiated from the inside of the network. With the Ettercap tool being publicly available, and versions that run on both Windows and Linux based operating systems, most network could be susceptible to this attack if mitigation techniques were not in place.
How to protect your network
By using the DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) features, multiple types of Layer 2 attacks, including the ARP Poisoning (MITM) attack can be stopped.
DHCP Snooping is a security feature capable of intercepting DHCP messages crossing a switch and blocking bogus DHCP offers. DHCP Snooping uses the concept of trusted and untrusted ports. Typically, the trusted ports are
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) is a security feature that helps prevent ARP poisoning and other ARP-based attacks by intercepting all ARP requests and responses, and by verifying their authenticity before updating the switch’s local ARP cache or forwarding the packets to the intended destinations. The DAI verification consists primarily of intercepting each ARP packet and comparing its MAC address and IP address information against the MAC-IP bindings contained in a trusted binding table. DAI discards any ARP packets that are inconsistent with the information contained in the binding table. The trusted binding table is dynamically populated by DHCP snooping when this feature is enabled. In addition, DAI allows the configuration of static ARP ACLs to support systems that use statically configured IP addresses and that do not rely on DHCP. DAI can also be configured to drop ARP packets with invalid IP addresses, such as 0.0.0.0 or 255.255.255.255, and ARP packets containing MAC addresses in their payloads that do not match the addresses specified the Ethernet headers.
Another important feature of DAI is that it implements a configurable rate-limit function that controls the number of incoming ARP packets. This function is particularly important because all validation checks are performed by the CPU, and without a rate-limiter, there could be a DoS condition.
DAI associates a trust state with each interface on the system, similar to DHCP Snooping. Packets arriving on trusted interfaces bypass all DAI validation checks, while those arriving on untrusted interfaces go through the DAI validation process. In a typical network configuration for DAI, all ports connected to host ports are configured as untrusted, while all ports connected to switches are configured as trusted. With this configuration, all ARP packets entering the network from a given switch will have passed the security check. By default, DAI is disabled on all VLANs, and all ports are configured as untrusted.
As discussed earlier, DAI populates its database of valid MAC address to IP address bindings through DHCP snooping. It also validates ARP packets against statically configured ARP ACLs. It is important to note that ARP ACLs have precedence over entries in the DHCP snooping database. ARP packets are first compared to user-configured ARP ACLs. If the ARP ACL denies the ARP packet, then the packet will be denied even if a valid binding exists in the database populated by DHCP snooping.
Note that configuring DHCP Snooping is a prerequisite to configure Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI). It is also worth noting that if you plan to use any static IP addresses are planned to be used when configuring DHCP Snooping and DAI, a static IP-to-MAC address mapping must also be entered in your Cisco Catalyst 6500 switches configuration. For instance, lets say that we want to assign a static IP-to-MAC mapping for the IP address 10.1.0.60 with the MAC address of 0023.6948.B89C for interface GE1/2 on VLAN 7 is required. The global configuration command on switch would be:
ip source binding 0023.6948.B89C vlan 7 10.1.0.60 interface Gi1/2
In computer networking, a media access control attack or MAC flooding is a technique employed to compromise the security of network switches. The attack works by forcing legitimate MAC table contents out of the switch and forcing a unicast flooding behavior potentially sending sensitive information to portions of the network where it is not normally intended to go.
Switches maintain a MAC table that maps individual MAC addresses on the network to the physical ports on the switch. This allows the switch to direct data out of the physical port where the recipient is located, as opposed to indiscriminately broadcasting the data out of all ports as a hub does. The advantage of this method is that data is bridged exclusively to the network segment containing the computer that the data is specifically destined for.
In a typical MAC flooding attack, a switch is fed many Ethernet frames, each containing different source MAC addresses, by the attacker. The intention is to consume the limited memory set aside in the switch to store the MAC address table.
The effect of this attack may vary across implementations, however the desired effect (by the attacker) is to force legitimate MAC addresses out of the MAC address table, causing significant quantities of incoming frames to be flooded out on all ports. It is from this flooding behavior that the MAC flooding attack gets its name.
After launching a successful MAC flooding attack, a malicious user can use a packet analyzer to capture sensitive data being transmitted between other computers, which would not be accessible were the switch operating normally. The attacker may also follow up with an ARP spoofing attack which will allow them to retain access to privileged data after switches recover from the initial MAC flooding attack. MAC flooding can be used as a rudimentary VLAN hopping attack.
How to prevent the attack
Port Security with Dynamically Learned and Static MAC Addresses
You can use port security with dynamically learned and static MAC addresses to restrict a port’s ingress traffic by limiting the MAC addresses that are allowed to send traffic into the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward ingress traffic that has source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the device attached to that port has the full bandwidth of the port.
A security violation occurs in either of these situations:
- When the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached on a secure port and the source MAC address of the ingress traffic is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, port security applies the configured violation mode.
- If traffic with a secure MAC address that is configured or learned on one secure port attempts to access another secure port in the same VLAN, applies the configured violation mode.
PortFast BPDU Guard
To prevent loops from occurring in a network, the PortFast mode is supported only on nontrunking access ports because these ports typically do not transmit or receive BPDUs. The most secure implementation of PortFast is to enable it only on ports that connect end stations to switches. Because PortFast can be enabled on nontrunking ports connecting two switches, spanning tree loops can occur because BPDUs are still being transmitted and received on those ports.
PortFast BPDU guard prevents loops by moving a nontrunking port into an errdisable state when a BPDU is received on that port. When you enable BPDU guard on the switch, spanning tree shuts down PortFast-configured interfaces that receive BPDUs instead of putting them into the spanning tree blocking state. In a valid configuration, PortFast-configured interfaces do not receive BPDUs. If a PortFast-configured interface receives a BPDU, an invalid configuration exists. BPDU guard provides a secure response to invalid configurations because the administrator must manually put the interface back in service.